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THREE YEARS AFTER
CAMPBELL V. A CUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC.:
WHAT IS FAIR GAME FOR PARODISTS?
Kathryn D. Piele*
"All creators draw in part on the work of those who came
before, referring to it, building on it, poking fun at it; we call
this creativity, not piracy.
'11
1. INTRODUCTION
Parody is defined as "a literary or musical work in which the style of
an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule."
2
Parodies are an accepted-form of comedy that range from the hysterically
funny to the blatantly offensive. Arguably, parodies, despite how funny or
offensive, do not normally turn thoughts to copyright law. Copyright law,
however, has found its way into the comedic land of parodies-and what
the courts have done is no laughing matter.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.3 the Supreme Court held that
parodies with a commercial purpose are presumptively not unfair uses of a
copyrighted work. In Campbell, the Court ended the misplaced emphasis
lower courts had placed on the commercial purpose of a parody when
evaluating whether the parody was a fair use of a copyrighted work. While
solving one problem, however, the Court created another by making a
distinction between parodies, which can claim fair use, and satires, which
* Judicial Clerk, Justice Allen T. Compton, Alaska Supreme Court, 1997-98. B.A., magna
cum laude, 1993, University of Arizona; J.D., 1997, University of Oregon School of Law, Order
of the Coif. This Article is dedicated to my Grandma, whose love and life are both motivating
and inspiring, and to my parents, to whom I owe it all. Thank you Shari Del Carlo for your
friendship; without it law school would have been unbearable. Thank you so very much
Professor Keith Aoki for sharing with me your vast knowledge of copyright law and for your
many words of support and encouragement. Thanks also to the editors and staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal.
1. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
2. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 613 (7th ed. 1967).
3. 510 U.S. 569(1994).
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must "stand on [their] own two feet. ' 4 Since Campbell, courts no longer
have to struggle with how to apply the four factors of the fair use analysis
to commercial parodies; courts are, however, left to decide whether the fair
use exception is even applicable to the parody before them. Thus, the
Court, instead of creating a bright-line analysis for evaluating parodies,
granted judges broad discretion to "critique the artistic meaning of the
particular parody in order to determine whether it merits fair-use
protection."5 This Article will attempt to answer the question: How have
judges used their discretion to limit the comedic arena of parody in the
three years following Campbell?
In Part I, this Article discusses the fair use doctrine and how parodies
fall within its protection. Part II describes how courts applied the four
factors of the fair use doctrine to parodies prior to Campbell. Part III
provides the holding in Campbell and how it changed the application of the
fair use doctrine to parodies, and Part IV depicts how cases subsequent to
Campbell have treated parodies. Finally, this Article summarizes the
problem with how copyright law treats parodies and recommends how
courts should change the current law.
II. INFRINGEMENT, THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE, AND
ITS APPLICATION TO PARODIES
A. Parodies: Are They Copyright Infringements?
To prove a prima facie case of copyright infringement against a
defendant-parodist, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original." 6 The second element can be satisfied in one of two ways: by
showing through direct evidence that the defendant copied the copyrighted
material, or by proving both that the defendant had "access to the
plaintiffs copyrighted work" and that "defendant's work is substantially
similar to the plaintiffs copyrightable material."7
4. Id. at 581.
5. Paul Tager Lehr, Note, The Fair-Use Doctrine Before and Afier "Pretty Woman's"
Unworkable Framework. The Adjustable Tool for Censoring Distasteful Parody, 46 FLA. L.
REV. 443, 447 (1994) ("Due to the practically unfettered discretion that the current fair-use
framework permits, judges inappropriately are permitted and, in fact, required to critique the
artistic meaning of the particular parody in order to determine whether it merits fair-use
protection.") (footnotes omitted).
6. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
7. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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Considering the two-part test described above, the determination of
whether a parody is a copyright infringement is case specific.
Consequently, courts usually have a very easy task deciding whether a
parody is a technical infringement of a copyright. Parodies, by their very
nature, are arguably copyright infringements because parodying another
work consists of taking part of a copyrighted work and manipulating it in a
humorous manner. Courts have recognized that parodies necessarily draw
on copyrighted works for their parodic effect. After comparing the
parodied work with the copyrighted work, many courts found that the
parody was, but for any defense, a copyright infringement.9  Still other
courts have quickly dismissed the requirements for a copyright
infringement by flatly stating the parody before them infringed the
copyrighted work, unless the defendant-parodist could articulate an
appropriate exception.'
0
Consequently, parodists, who utilize others' work for comedic effect,
will almost certainly fail in arguing to the court that the parody is not
technically a copyright infringement." Rather, a parodist's strength lies in
persuading the court that regardless of a technical violation of the
Copyright Act of 1976,12 the parody is a fair use of the original work.
B. So, Your Parody Infringes on Someone's Copyright-Now What?
If a plaintiff can prove the two requirements necessary to make out a
prima facie case of infringement, the defendant-parodist's parody is in
violation of the Copyright Act of 1976 unless the parodist can establish a
8. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1267
(N.D. Okla. 1994), affd, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) ("It has been acknowledged that parody
must, to some extent, copy its subject matter.").
9. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal.
1996), aftFd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda
Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765
F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
10. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574 ("It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew's song would
be an infringement of Acuff-Rose's rights in 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' under the Copyright Act of
1976 ... but for a finding of fair use through parody."); Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1218 ("The
within case is that rare case where there is direct evidence-in fact, a frank admission by the
defendant--that the allegedly infringing work is modelled [sic] on the copyrighted work.").
11. See Joseph E. Sullivan, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., and the Economic
Approach to Parody: An Appeal to the Supreme Court, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV.
105, 112 (1993) ("[S]ince parodies draw attention to the original works that they are ridiculing,
it is unlikely that any copyright infringement claim brought against a parodist will fail to meet
this primary burden.").
12. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1994)).
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defense to the infringement. A defendant-parodist's best defense to
copyright infringement is to argue that the parody was a fair use of the
copyrighted work. 13  The fair use exception, which limits the exclusive
rights of copyright owners, is codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 (hereinafter section 107). This defense provides parodists the
opportunity to prove that, rather than infringing on the plaintiff's
copyright, the parody was a fair use of the plaintiff's copyrighted work.14
The fair use exception provides, in part, that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism [or] comment... is
not an infringement of copyright."' 5 Courts have readily applied the fair
use defense to parodies by finding that parodies constitute a criticism of or
comment on a copyrighted work.'6  Additionally, courts Ipoint to the
legislative history surrounding the adoption of section 107. In a 1961
report, Congress listed parodies as one potential application of the fair use
exception. Most recently, the Supreme Court validated lower courts'
findings that parodies may claim fair use protection by stating that "[w]e
thus line up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment
or criticism, may claim fair use under [section] 107." 1  In sum, the
combination of these authorities warrants affording the fair use defense to
parodies.
The evaluation of an infringing parody, however, does not end with
the finding that section 107 is germane to parodies. Rather, section 107
sets out a four-pronged analysis for courts to use when deciding whether
the fair use defense is applicable in each specific case:
13. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 112 ("[Plarody cases usually turn on whether the
defendant's use of the original was fair within the meaning of section 107.") (footnote omitted).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
15. Id.
16. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 108 ("While section 107 does not directly address the term
'parody' .. . [c]ourts have had little difficulty in concluding that parodies fall under the rubric of
'criticism' or 'comment' as set forth in section 107.") (footnotes omitted).
17. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Congress listed examples
'of the sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances.' Congress
named parody as one of these activities.") (citation omitted); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("A list of examples of fair use which the
Committee derived from the Register's 1961 Report includes 'use in a parody of some of the
content of the work parodied .... ') (alteration in original).
18. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678
("[T]he [Copyright] Register's 1961 Report, while by no means exhaustive, gives some idea of
the sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances: . . .[the list
includes] 'use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied ....
19. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted works as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
20
Courts have repeatedly stated that application of the four-pronged
analysis set out in section 107 is case specific and flexible--leaving no
bright-line rules for courts to use when evaluating the fair use defense.
2 1
The four individual prongs of the fair use analysis should be weighed
together to determine whether a parody is fair use of a copyrighted work or
an infringement. Specifically, the Court in Campbell stated that the four
fair use factors should not be treated in isolation from each other. Rather,
"[a]ll are to be explored, and the results weighted together, in light of the
purposes of copyright.' ' 22  The four-pronged fair use analysis requires
courts to look at every case individually and apply the factors in a way that
"avoid[s] rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."
23
III. COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE PRE-CAMPBELL
Following the codification of the fair use defense, courts failed to
uniformly agree on how to apply the four-pronged analysis set out in
section 107 to parodies. For example, parody cases often contained
conflicting opinions with respect to the importance of commercial use.24
Some circuits, such as the Second Circuit, simply presumed that
commercial exploitation was an unfair use.
25  In Fisher v. Dees,2 6
20. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
21. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("[W]ithin each case, courts are not to apply the four-part test as a rigid formula; the
factors listed are nonexclusive and must be considered as integrated parts of a flexible
examination.").
22. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
23. Id. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,236 (1990)).
24. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 121.
25. Id. at 128.
26. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
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however, the Ninth Circuit held the presumption that a commercial parody
is unfair use of a copyrighted work can be rebutted where the defendant
convinces the court the parody does not "unfairly diminish the economic
value of the original."
27
While most courts struggled over whether the commercial aspect of
the parody would render the parody an unfair use of the copyrighted work,
other courts grappled with whether the parody before them was even a
parody at all. If a court concluded that the defendant's work was not a
parody, the defendant's claim of fair use was void. For example, in Tin
Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., the District Court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that a beer commercial, with actors
imitating the rap group "The Fat Boys," did not qualify as a parody
because it did not "buil[d] upon the original," nor did it contribute
"something new for humorous effect or commentary." 29 Finally, courts
were in disagreement over whether the parody had to comment or criticize
the actual copyrighted work itself to be considered fair use, or whether
using a copyrighted work to parody life and society could be considered
fair use. Some courts held that a parody must specifically comment or
criticize the copyrighted work to be considered fair use. The District Court
for the Southern District of New York in Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co.,3° however, held that it is possible to find fair use even if
the defendant's work did not specifically parody the plaintiff's song.
31
The district court stated that "[t]o the extent that [other courts] can be read
to require that there be an identity between the song copied and the subject
of the parody, this Court disagrees."
32
In the fifteen years following the codification of the fair use defense,
courts were obviously in conflict with each other regarding the application
of the four-pronged fair use analysis to parodies.33 Consequently, whether
a court would hold a parody to be fair use of a copyrighted work was
unpredictable. The stage was set for the Supreme Court to step in and
clear up the many ambiguities left by the lower courts' decisions. What
the Court did, however, was anything but clear.
27. Id. at 437.
28. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
29. Id. at 832 (quoting Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 252 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
30. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
31. Id. at 746.
32. Id.
33. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Mhe
standards for applying the fair use defense in parody cases, like the standards for applying the
fair use in other contexts, have been a source of considerable attention and dispute.").
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IV. THE CASE: CAMPBELL v. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC.
A. The Facts
Plaintiff, Acuff-Rose Music, held the copyrights to the song Oh,
Pretty Woman, written by Roy Orbison and William Dees in 1964. In
1989, Luther R. Campbell, a member of the group 2 Live Crew, wrote a
song entitled Pretty Woman.35 According to Campbell, the song was
"intended, 'through comical lyrics, to satirize the original work."'
36
Acuff-Rose refused to grant 2 Live Crew permission to use Oh, Pretty
Woman for their parody, even though 2 Live Crew offered to give Orbison
and Dees credit for the original, as well as pay Acuff-Rose a fee for using
the song.37  In spite of Acuff-Rose's refusal to grant 2 Live Crew
permission to use the song, "2 Live Crew released records, cassette tapes,
and compact discs of 'Pretty Woman' in a collection of songs entitled 'As
Clean As .They Wanna Be."' 38 2 Live Crew gave Orbison, Dees, and
Acuff-Rose credit for authoring and publishing the original version.
39
Approximately one year after 2 Live Crew released As Clean As They
Wanna Be, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew and the group's record company
for copyright infringement.
40
B. The Lower Court's Disposition of the Case
The district court ruled in favor of defendant 2 Live Crew, granting
their motion for summary judgment. 41  The district court reached its
decision by weighing a number of factors. First, the district court held that
the commercial nature of the parody did not render it a presumptively
unfair use of the copyrighted work. Second, the district court found 2
Live Crew's song Pretty Woman to be a parody of Oh, Pretty Woman.
43
Third, the district court held that 2 Live Crew "appropriat[ed] no more
from the original than [was] necessary to accomplish reasonably its
34. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a).
37. Id. at 572-73.
38. Id. at 573.
39. Id.
40. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573.
41. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 792
F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992).
42. Id. at 1154.
43. Id. at 1154-55.
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parodic purpose." 44 Finally, the district court found that the 2 Live Crew
song would not likely have a negative impact on the market for Orbison
and Dees' song.
4 5
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision and held that "[t]he four factors set forth in section 107 of the
[Copyright] Act support the conclusion that 2 Live Crew's use of Acuff-
Rose's copyrighted song was not a fair use. ' '46 While the court of appeals
accepted the district court's finding that 2 Live Crew's Pretty Woman was
a parody of Orbison and Dees' song, the agreement between the two courts
ended there. 47 The Sixth Circuit found that the district court failed to
sufficiently emphasize the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody and
that a commercial parody was a presumptively unfair use of a copyrighted
work.48 The Sixth Circuit then turned to the question of whether 2 Live
Crew was able to successfully rebut the presumption of unfair use by
showing that the parody did not "diminish the economic value of the
original. '49 The court held that in light of the commercial nature of the
parody, 2 Live Crew's song was an unfair use of Oh, Pretty Woman.
50
C. The Supreme Court's Holding and Rationale
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the sole purpose of
deciding if 2 Live Crew's commercial parody could be a fair use.5 1 The
Court recognized that but for a finding of fair use, 2 Live Crew's song
Pretty Woman was an infringement on Acuff-Rose's copyrighted song.52
The Court's opinion opened with a brief history of the fair use
doctrine, which included setting out the four-pronged fair use analysis, as
codified in section 107.53  The Court noted that the fair use doctrine
required a flexible case-by-case analysis because bright-line rules were
inappropriate
44. Id. at 1157.
45. Id. at 1158.
46. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510
U.S. 569 (1994).
47. Id. at 1435 ("We accept the district court's conclusion that the purpose of the use was
to parody the original.").
48. Id. at 1437.
49. Id. (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986)).
50. Id. at 1439.
51. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 576-77.
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when determining fair use.5 4 The Court then evaluated 2 Live Crew's song
under the four-prong analysis of section 107.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
The primary concern for a court deciding if the first factor weighs in
the parodist's favor is whether the parody is transformative of the original
work. According to the Court, the aim of the first factor is to ascertain
"whether the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original
creation or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character ... it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative."' 55  To what extent the secondary work is
transformative of the copyrighted work is important to decipher because
the "more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use."56 The Court found that parodies have a transformative value, and, in
fact, "provide social benefit." 7 Thus, the Court concluded parodies may
claim fair use protection from copyright infringement liability under
section 107.58
Next, the Court distinguished parodies from satires and held that only• • - 59
parodies may claim fair use. The heart of a parodist's claim of fair use,
the Court stated, is that parodists use copyrighted work to criticize or
comment on another author's original work.6 0  If a parody fails to
comment or criticize the "substance or style of the original composition,"
and only uses the original work to "avoid the drudgery in working up
something fresh," the parodist's fair use argument will be greatly
diminished. In that situation, other factors, such as the parody's
commercial purpose, will be given greater weight.6 1  In sum, for a
secondary work to be considered a parody, and afforded the full protection
of the fair use defense, it must "mimic an original to make its point, and
[have] some claim to use the creation of its victim's ... imagination...
,62 However, a satire "can stand on its own two feet and so requires
54. Id. at 577.
55. Id. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
56. Id.
57. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 580-81.
60. Id. at 580.
61. Id.
62. Id at 580-81.
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justification for the very act of borrowing. ' 63 The Court concluded that a
secondary work is only a parody deserving of fair use protection if the
"parodic character may reasonably be perceived."6 The Court found that
2 Live Crew's song was a parody of Oh, Pretty Woman, and not a satire,
because the secondary work could "reasonably . . . be 6?erceived as
commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree."
Finally, the Court addressed the emphasis the Sixth Circuit placed on
the parody's commercial nature. The Court pointed out that section 107
makes the commercial nature of a secondary work only one of many
factors to be considered when determining fair use.66 According to the
Court, lower courts that found commercial parodies to be a presumptively
unfair use of a copyrighted work were not fulfilling Congress' purpose of
preserving the fair use tradition.67 Consequently, the weight the Sixth
Circuit gave to the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody was
contrary to the congressional purpose behind section 107.68
2. Nature of Copyrighted Work
The Court held that Orbison and Dees' song was an original creative
expression and "[fell] within the core of the copyright's protective
purposes." Finding that the original work was quintessentially protected
by copyright law, however, was unhelpful in the Court's analysis of
parodies and fair use because parodies typically copy an expressive
work.
70
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Copyrighted Work
Used by the Parodist
The third factor, which looks at the amount of the copyrighted work
used by the parodist, is related to both the first and the fourth factors of the
fair use doctrine. Specifically, the permissible amount a parodist may
copy from a copyrighted work is tied to both the purpose and character of
63. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581; see also Lehr, supra note 5, at 470 ("If, however, the
secondary work merely uses the original to criticize or comment on society (or on anything
other than the original work), then the secondary work is not a parody and, thus, does not merit
the fair-use protection articulated in Acuff-Rose.").
64. Id. at 582.
65. Id. at 583.
66. Id. at 584.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 583-85.
69. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
70. Id.
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the parody, as well as the market effect the parody will have on the
original work.7' If a large portion of the original work is copied verbatim,
it points toward a finding that the parody lacks transformative value and
that the market value of the original is more likely to be affected.
72
Additionally, this factor requires courts to look not only at the amount of
copying done by the parodist but at the substance of the copying as well.73
The Court, seemingly, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's holding that
2 Live Crew copied more from the original song than was necessary to
conjure up enough of the original for a humorous effect. The Court stated
that a parody necessarily uses a recognizable work for comedic effect.
74
When a parodist "takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must
be able to 'conjure up' at least enough of that original to make the object
of its critical wit recognizable."75 Once enough of the original is copied to
make it recognizable, the permissibility of any excess copying depends on
76the weight of the other three factors. 2 Live Crew's parody struck "at the
heart" of the original song, yet this fact did not dictate that the third fair-
use factor weigh in Campbell's favor because it was the heart of the song
that 2 Live Crew was seeking to parody.
77
The Court did not ultimately reach a final decision on whether 2 Live
Crew's song inappropriately copied the original song. Even in light of the
belief that taking the heart of an original work is not necessarily
impermissible copying, the Court stated that a "parodist [may not] skim
the cream and get away scot free." 78 2 Live Crew copied the first line of
Oh, Pretty Woman as well as the bass riff and other distinctive sounds
heard throughout the original song.79 The Court found that 2 Live Crew's
song was not a verbatim copy of the original song and held that 2 Live
Crew copied no more than necessary of the copyrighted lyrics. The Court,
however, remanded to the lower court the issue of whether 2 Live Crew's
use of the music was excessive copying.80
71. Id. at 586-87.
72. Id. at 587-88 ("[A] work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with
little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the
original.").
73. Id. at 588.
74. Id.
75. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 589.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 594.
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4. Effect on Original Work's Potential Market or Value
The fourth factor requires courts to look, not only at the harm to the
market caused by the infringer, but also at whether the infringing work will
adversely affect the original work. The Court held that the appellate
court inappropriately made a presumption about commercial parodies and
incorrectly resolved the fourth factor in favor of Acuff-Rose. The court
of appeals should have looked at the transformative nature of the parody,
instead of the commercial nature of the parody, when evaluating whether
the parody was likely to cause market harm. If a parody is largely
transformative, the potential harm to the market is less likely because there
is a greater difference between the parody and the original." This is
because "the parody and the original usually serve different market
functions. ' 85 Furthermore, while it cannot be said that a parody does not
harm the market at all, the harm caused by a parody is not meant to be
remedied by the Copyright Act.86 While copyrighted works are protected
against parodies that displace the original work, they are not protected
against parodies that merely disparage the original. This notion is
"reflected in the rule that there is no protectable derivative market for
criticism."
88
In sum, the Court concluded that it was impossible to decide whether
2 Live Crew's song impermissibly harmed the market because of the
inadequacies in the court record. 89 Specifically, the record was void of any
evidence on the potential harm of the rap market by 2 Live Crew's
parody.90
5. Final Holding
After weighing all of the factors enumerated in section 107, the Court
concluded that the court of appeals erred in holding that 2 Live Crew's
commercial parody was presumptively an unfair use of Acuff-Rose's
81. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
82. Id. at 591.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 591-92.
87. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 594.
90. Id. at 593.
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copyrighted song.9 1  The appellate court incorrectly assumed a
presumption against commercial parodies when evaluating both the first
and the fourth factors of the fair use analysis. As a result, the case was
remanded to the court of appeals for further findings in light of the Court's
opinion.
V. DISTRICT COURT ATTEMPTS TO INTERPRET CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE
Soon after the Court's decision in Campbell, three different U.S.
District Courts were called upon to interpret its affect on the fair use
analysis. Campbell arguably introduced an additional step in the analysis
before reaching the section 107 factors, a step that vests a substantial
amount of interpretive discretion in the lower courts. After Campbell,
courts must first determine whether the challenged use is a parody or a
satire. In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n,92 Dr.
Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,93 and Leibovitz v.
Paramount Pictures Corp.,9 4  each district court was faced with
determining the extent of this new-found discretion.
A. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n
95
1. The Facts
Cardtoons, L.C. is the maker of baseball cards, called "Cardtoons,"
which depict cartoon caricatures of Major League Baseball players. The
Major League Baseball Players Association (the "Association"), the
exclusive bargaining agent of major league baseball players, claimed that
the cards infringed upon the Association's right of publicity as protected
by Oklahoma law, and ordered Cardtoons to cease and desist from
91. Id. at 594.
92. 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994), afFd, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
93. 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
95. 868 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Okla. 1994), aff'd, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
96. Oklahoma's right of publicity statute reads:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes
of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods,
or services, without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof, and any
profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use shall be taken into
account when computing the actual damages.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1449(A)(1985).
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publishing its cards. Cardtoons brought an action seeking a declaratory
judgment that its cards did not violate the Association's publicity rights. A
magistrate judge originally held in favor of the Association, finding that
the cards violated Oklahoma's right of publicity.97 Cardtoons appealed the
magistrate's decision to the district court, arguing that its cards were a
parody of "widely-known individuals and institutions.""8  While the
Association did not assert a copyright claim against Cardtoons, the district
court held that copyright law was applicable to the right of publicity by
analogy.99 After weighing the fair use factors, the district court held that
Cardtoons' trading cards were a "fair use" of the Association's publicity
rights.
100
2. To Be An Effective Parody
The district court rejected the Association's claim that because the
cards copied traditional baseball cards licensed by the Association, the
cards infringed on the players' rights of publicity.1 1 The district court
found instead that the individual's image on the cards was essential to
create an effective parody, and without the "visual identification with the
parody's target" the parody would be wholly unsuccessful. 102 The court
held that in order for "Cardtoons" to effectively parody baseball cards,
they must imitate the look of baseball cards. 103 Based on Campbell, the
district court found that a parody must copy some of the original work to
achieve the desired comedic effect.104 Furthermore, the court held that if
"Cardtoons" were not published in the baseball card form, the attempt to
parody the traditional baseball card by evoking the baseball card image
would be largely unsuccessful.' 05
After extensive discussion concerning the definition of a parody, the
court concluded that "Cardtoons" fit that definition.1 6 While the form of
97. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1268 (holding that the Oklahoma statute was meant to
"protect individuals, celebrities or otherwise, from having distinguishing characteristics of their
persona exploited, to the commercial benefit of another").
98. Id. at 1267.
99. Id. at 1271.
100. Id. at 1274.
101. Id. at 1267.
102. Id. at 1268.
103. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1267.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1268.
106. Id. ("A parodist takes a person, exaggerates and distorts facets of the person until
hilarity ensures, and markets the result . . .. mhe parodist has studied the original and
modified it until it is something that could never be mistaken for its progenitor.").
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baseball cards was imitated, the image of the baseball players and the
statistical information on the back of the card were extremely
exaggerated. 10 7  As discussed above, the district court analogized
copyright law to the Oklahoma statute granting publicity rights; thus,
"under the standard applicable to parody under copyright law, Cardtoons
would be eligible for a fair use analysis."
08
a. Purpose and Character of the Parody
The district court, referencing the Court's decision in Campbell,
dismissed the three cases cited by the magistrate as standing for the
proposition that commercial parodies are presumptively unfair use.109
Pursuant to Campbell, the commercial nature of a parody should only be
considered as one factor among many and should not be determinative
when deciding fair use.110  Further, the court held that commercial
parodies sold for a profit may claim greater First Amendment protection
than those which merely advertise other products."' Therefore,
"Cardtoons," being of the former category, should be afforded First
Amendment protection.112
b. Nature of Copyrighted Work
The district court considered the facial images of baseball players to
be factual; hence, the baseball players' images were afforded less
protection from fair use. 13 The court explained that a person's facial
image is not a result of creativity and should not be entitled to the same
protection as an original creative work.
114
c. Amount and Substantiality of Original Work Used by Parodist
The district court held the amount and substantiality of original work
used by parodists weighed in favor of Cardtoons because the cards copied
no more than necessary to achieve its parodic effect.1 15  Cardtoons
depicted the images of the baseball players on the "Cardtoons" by using
107. Id.
108. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1271.
109. Id. at 1271-72.
110. Id. at 1272.
111. Id. at 1273.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1273.
115. Id. at 1273-74.
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drawn caricatures, not photographs. The caricatures of the baseball
players were enough to conjure up the image of the parody's target-any
less copying would have defeated the parody's purpose.i16
d. Effect on the Potential Market or Value of Copyrighted Work
The potential for Cardtoons' cards to usurp the Association's market
of licensed cards would increase if the "Cardtoons" were virtual copies of
the licensed baseball cards. Thus, this factor would weigh in favor of
finding unfair use. The court found, however, that it was unlikely that the
caricatures on the "Cardtoons" would misplace the market for the real
baseball cards licensed by the Association."17  While the traditional
baseball cards licensed by the Association gave an accurate depiction of
the baseball player and accurate statistics, the "Cardtoons" featured only a
caricature of the player and gave humorous statistics. 118 Based on the vast
market for baseball cards and the differences between Cardtoons' cards
and the traditional baseball cards, the court concluded that "Cardtoons
trading cards [were] not a substitute product, and [could not] fulfill
demand for the original."
' 19
3. The Effect of Campbell on the District Court's Decision
Campbell provided the district court in Cardtoons with clear
guidelines on how to evaluate the commercial nature of the trading cards.
The district court definitively reversed the magistrate's holding that the
commercial nature of the parody was a key factor in deciding fair use.
Instead, the court followed Campbell and only considered the commercial
nature of a parody as one factor among many.
A substantial amount of the district court's opinion discussed the
definition of parody and the determination of whether "Cardtoons" fit that
definition. The court, however, did not grapple with the question of
whether "Cardtoons" commented on or criticized the original work, or
commented on or criticized society as a whole. Arguably, the nature of the
cards, which parodied the images and statistics of baseball players as seen
116. Id. at 1274.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. In 1996, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in Cardtoons.
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996)
("The cards... are an important form of entertainment and social commentary that deserve First
Amendment protection. Accordingly, we affirm.").
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on licensed, traditional baseball cards, allowed the court to avoid the
difficult task of distinguishing between parodies and satires.
B. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.
121
1. The Facts
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. ("Dr. Seuss") sought a preliminary
injunction from the District Court for the Southern District of California to
enjoin the Penguin Books USA, Inc. ("Penguin Books") from publishing
the book The Cat NOT in the Hat!, a spoof on the O.J. Simpson criminal
trial set to the distinctive Dr. Suess rhyming style. 122 The book, however,
put a twist on selective illustrations and rhymes to tell the story of the O.J.
Simpson trial. 123  Dr. Seuss alleged that the book infringed on the
copyrights in the original Dr. Suess books by taking a substantial portion
of the copyrighted works. 124 While Penguin Books did not deny that it
"relied upon Dr. Seuss's [sic] book in putting together [its] own," it argued
that their book was not an infringement on Dr. Seuss' copyrights but was
instead a "fair use."'
125
The court granted Dr. Seuss' request for a preliminary injunction,
finding that the Dr. Seuss would likely prevail against Penguin Books' fair
use defense.126 Penguin Books, however, requested reconsideration of the
ruling in light of newly discovered evidence. The discussion below is
based on the court's reconsideration of the order granting the plaintiffs
request for a preliminary injunction, wherein the district court modified the
preliminary injunction, keeping the bulk of the earlier judgment intact.
2. Requirements For a Preliminary Injunction
To be granted a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove a
121. 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affid, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 1561. It was undisputed that the book's rhymes, illustrations, and packaging
"mimic the distinctive style of the family of works created by Theodore S. Geisel, better known
as Dr. Seuss." Id. (footnote omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1562.
126. Id. For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must prove either: (a)
likely success on the merits of the case and the possibility that they will suffer irreparable injury
if the injunction is not granted, or, (b) the plaintiff must prove that serious hardship will be
suffered. The plaintiffs burden of proving that they will succeed on the merits of the case
"includes the burden of showing a likelihood that it would prevail against any affirmative
defenses raised by the defendant." Id.
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likelihood of success on the merits of the case. Thus, Dr. Seuss was
required to prove the two elements of a prima facie case of copyright
infringement. 127 Dr. Seuss also had to prove that it would prevail against
any affirmative defenses raised by Penguin Books, such as the defense of
fair use. After substantial discussion regarding the elements of copyright
infringement, the district court concluded that Penguin Books, barring any
affirmative defense, infringed the copyrights of Horton Hatches the Egg
and The Cat in the Hat.128 Thus, the first requirement for obtaining a
preliminary injunction was met. Finally, the district court evaluated
Penguin Book's work under the four-pronged fair use analysis to decide
whether Dr. Seuss could prove likely success against Penguin Books'
affirmative defense of fair use.
3. Parody or Satire?
Dr. Seuss argued that only parodies are afforded the protection of the
fair use defense and that Penguin Books' work was not a parody because it
did not comment on or criticize the copyrighted work. Penguin Books,
however, asserted that both parodies and satires are equally allowed to
claim fair use.129 The district court stated that while Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Campbell, as well as the Second and Ninth Circuits, found
that only parodies may claim fair use, the Campbell majority did not
clearly support either position. 13 Seemingly, the district court ignored the
majority in Campbell, which stated that a satire must "stand on its own two
feet," and only because parodies "mimic an original to make [their] point
[do they] have some claim to use the creation of its victim's . .
imagination ...."131 The district court, however, chose to follow the
precedent of both the Second and Ninth Circuits and extended fair use
protection only to parodies, not satires.
132
Satirists, the court held, have many alternatives when choosing what
works to draw from when commenting on social conditions. 133 A satirist
can easily take from copyrighted work, as well as unprotected work, to
127. See supra Part II.A.
128. Penguin Books, 924 F. Supp. at 1563-65. While the defendant's book also contained
illustrations similar to other Dr. Seuss books, some of the illustrations had fallen into the public
domain. Thus, Dr. Seuss was barred from claiming infringement. Id. at 1565.
129. Id. at 1567.
130. Id.
131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
132. Penguin Books, 924 F. Supp. at 1567.
133. Id.
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achieve their satiric goal.134 It is only when a satirist chooses to parody a
copyrighted work itself "does the taking of protected expression from the
work become permissible, and even then, only in such amounts as is
required to fulfill the parodic purpose."' 35 According to the district court,
the most important factor in deciding fair use is whether there is an effect
on the market, which significantly weighs against the finding that satires
should be afforded fair use protection. An unlicensed satire, the court
held, "deprives the author of potential license fees for derivative works,
[while] the parodist is presumed to operate within a market
imperfection. ' d36  In sum, it is only when a parody is directed at the
original work itself that a parodist can claim there was no alternative but to
copy some aspects of the original copyrighted work.
137
Reaching an arguably tortured outcome, the court concluded that part
of the book was a parody, while another part was a satire and could not be
considered a fair use. The court concluded that the book failed to
comment on the text and themes of The Cat in the Hat. Penguin Books
did, however, have a claim of parody concerning its use of Horton Hatches
the Egg. 13  Thus, Dr. Seuss only demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits as to The Cat in the Hat infringement claim. It did notprove a
likelihood of success with regard to Horton Hatches the Eg. The
district court modified the preliminary injunction accordingly.
1
4. The Apparent Effect of Campbell on the District Court's Decision
What can be said about the district court's interpretation of
Campbell? Confused? Incorrect? The Campbell Court made it very clear
that only parodies that comment on the original work were afforded the
full protection of the fair use claim. Regardless of how one chooses to
classify the district court's interpretation-or rather misinterpretation-of
134. Id. at 1568.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1569.
137. Id.
138. Penguin Books, 924 F. Supp. at 1570.
139. Id.
140. In 1997, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in Penguin. Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit
recognized that there is a difference between parodies and satires and noted that if the plaintiff's
copyrighted work is not a direct target of the defendant's work, the defendant's work is not a
"parody" in the legal sense. Id. at 1400-01. The appellate court concluded that while "The Cat
NOT in the Hat! does broadly mimic Dr. Seuss' characteristic style, it does not hold his style up
to ridicule." Id. at 1401 (emphasis in original). After applying the four fair use factors, the
appellate court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1403.
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Campbell, Dr. Suess v. Penguin Books clearly illustrates the incongruous
results a court can reach when attempting to distinguish between a satire
and a parody. The court found, within the same book, both a satiric and
parodic work, holding that only part of the book could claim fair use while
the other part of the book was an unlawful infringement. It is doubtful
whether a reader of The Cat NOT in the Hat! would recognize a difference
between the author's treatment of The Cat in the Hat and Horton Hatches
the Egg.
Instead of reaching the logical conclusion that The Cat NOT in the
Hat! parodied Dr. Seuss themes to comment and criticize the O.J. Simpson
trial, the court analyzed the work to determine whether it was a satire or a
parody and afforded protection accordingly. Thus, while the district court
did not take direction for its action from Campbell, the court did precisely
what Campbell requires courts to do-differentiate between satires and
parodies and only allow parodies the right to claim fair use. It is not clear
what the outcome in Dr. Suess v. Penguin Books reveals about the
discretion given by Campbell to judges deciding what deserves protection
and what does not. At least one district court, however, made a distinction
between a satire and a parody that appears to directly contradict common
sense.
C. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
14 1
1. The Facts
Annie Leibovitz, the photographer of the Vanity Fair cover featuring
a naked and pregnant Demi Moore, sued Paramount Pictures Corp. for
copyright infringement over Paramount's spoof of the Leibovitz picture,
an advertisement for the movie Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult,
featuring the head of Leslie Nielsen superimposed on a naked and pregnant
body.'4 2  Paramount defended its advertisement by arguing that the
photograph was a parody and that the advertisement was a fair use of
Leibovitz's work. 14 3 The district court, after weighing the four prongs of
the fair use analysis, held that the Nielsen photograph was a parody and,
therefore, a fair use of Leibovitz's copyrighted work. 
44
141. 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
142. Id at 1215.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1226 ("Three of the four fair use factors in the present case militate in favor of a
finding of fair use, largely because the defendant's transformation of the plaintiffs photograph
has resulted in public access to two distinct works .... ").
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2. The Fair Use Factors
a. Purpose and Character of the Parody
The court began its discussion of the first prong of the fair use
analysis by noting that the Court in Campbell refuted the notion that
commercial parodies were presumptively an unfair use of a copyrighted
work. 145 The district court stated that the important issue when discerning
in whose favor the first fair use factor should fall is the transformative
extent of the parody. 146 If the parody is found to be largely transformative
of the original work, the other factors, such as the commercial nature of
the parody, will be less important.
147
The parody must first qualify as a parody deserving of the fair use
defense. Based on the Court's holding in Campbell, the district court
stated that "[t]o qualify as a parody ... the second work must comment
upon or criticize the original copyrighted work."'148  The district court
discussed the Campbell Court's distinction between parodies and satires,
emphasizing that if a derivative work lacks direct references to the
copyrighted work, it is not a parody, and will not fall under the fair use
exception. 149 The district court held that the Nielsen photograph clearly
parodied the Leibovitz photograph, illustrating the broad discretion
granted by the Campbell Court to decide whether a secondary work is a
parody or a satire-and subsequently unfair use.150
The district court concluded that the Nielsen photograph was meant
to mock the image of Moore, which had become a "cultural icon."151 It is
the comparison between Moore's beauty and Nielsen's ridiculousness, the
court stated, that made the parody funny. 152 Furthermore, the pregnant
Moore provided the necessary image for the Nielsen photograph to
highlight the movie's plot.' 5 3 It was what the Moore photo came to
represent to the public, "pregnancy as a source of pride and a particular
145. Id. at 1219.
146. Id. at 1220.
147. Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1220.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1222-23. Leibovitz supported the district court's finding that the photograph of
Nielsen was a parody by stating in her deposition that she thought the Nielsen picture was a
parody of her own. Id.
151. Id. at 1221-22 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 1222.
153. Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1222.
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form of beauty," that the Nielsen photograph was juxtaposing against the
movie's theme of fear of fatherhood.
15 4
The district court then continued its analysis of the first prong by
turning to both the character and the purpose of the parody. The district
court found the Nielsen 5picture to be transformative in character, yet also
commercial in nature. As noted earlier, the commercial nature of the
photograph did not preclude a finding of fair use. Campbell, however, did
state that a commercial parody used solely to advertise another product
deserved less protection than a parody that is sold for its own value. 156 In
making the final determination of whom the first factor should favor, the
district court turned to the purpose behind copyright law to encourage the
dissemination of creative works. 57 The court held that the first fair use
factor must be decided in favor of Paramount.
158
b. Nature of Copyrighted Work
The district court had little difficulty in deciding that Leibovitz's
picture was a highly creative work.'59 The court, however, followed the
Supreme Court's precedent in finding that this factor was of less
importance in parody cases.
160
c. Amount and Substantiality of Copyrighted Work Used by Parodist
In the court's resolution of the third factor, it considered whether
Paramount "took more than was reasonably required to 'conjure up' the
Moore photograph in creating the Nielsen ad."' The court decided that,
while the Nielsen ad took some of the distinctive features of the Leibovitz
picture, that fact did not dictate a finding against Paramount on the third
factor. 162 Accordingly, the court followed the Campbell decision, and held
that even if the defendant took the heart of an original work, the defense of
fair use could still be asserted. The district court noted the heart of the
original work is what will likely "conjure up" the work being parodied. 1
63
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1223.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1223.
158. Id.
159. Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1223.
160. Id. at 1224.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1225.
163. Id. at 1224.
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The court then turned to the issue of whether the Nielsen ad borrowed
too much from the Leibovitz picture. While the court found that the
Nielsen photograph was similar in many respects to Leibovitz's picture,
the court noted that the Nielsen photograph was of a different pregnant
woman, and Nielsen's head was superimposed on the woman's body.164
The court concluded that in light of the parodic purpose of the Nielsen
photograph, the photograph took no more than necessary from the
Leibovitz picture than needed to "conjure up" the Moore picture and
achieve Paramount's desired effect.'
65
d. Effect on Potential Market
The district court began its analysis of the last fair use factor by
agreeing with the Supreme Court's recognition in Campbell that "there is
no protectable derivative market for criticism."' 166 The court noted that
because parody is transformative of an original work, it is unlikely to.... 167
displace or harm the original work in its market. In fact, Leibovitz
admitted in her deposition that she was unaware of any adverse effects that
the Nielsen photograph had on the marketing of her Moore photograph.
168
In sum, the court concluded that the Nielsen photograph did not serve as a
market substitution for the Moore photograph, the only type of harm
remedied by the Copyright Act. Thus, the court determined that the fourth
fair use factor weighed in favor of Paramount.
169
3. The Influence of Campbell on the District Court's Decision
In concluding that the Nielsen photograph was a fair use of
Leibovitz's picture, the district court relied heavily on the precedent set in
Campbell. First, the court read Campbell as requiring a parody to criticize
or comment on an original copyrighted work in order to qualify as a
parody, and thus a fair use.170 Second, the district court used the discretion
granted by the Campbell Court and analyzed the Nielsen photograph to
determine whether it was meant to parody society and life or whether the
Nielsen photograph intended to parody the beauty of Moore's pregnant
164. Id. at 1225.
165. Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1225.
166. Id. at 1226.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1226.
170. Id. at 1220.
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body. 171 The court went a step further, determining that the Moore
photograph represented a beautiful woman taking pride in her pregnant
body and that the Nielsen photograph took direct aim at that notion. Thus,
the district court decided both what the original work represented and what
the parody was saying about the original work. As a result of Campbell,
the court's critique of the two works stood as a gatekeeper to fair use
protection. Thus, the Leibovitz opinion represents parody's nebulous
position when a court is granted sole discretion to interpret a secondary
work as a parody or a satire, and grant fair use protection accordingly.
While the conclusion this court reached was not irrational, the decision
represents the broad discretion trial courts have when a parody case is
before them.
VI. CRITICISM OF THE CURRENT LAW AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. What the Court Did Wrong
After Campbell, courts have broad discretion to assess secondary
works and decide which are parodies and which are satires. Furthermore,
as seen in the cases discussed above, the distinction between the two has
become quite important. If a court finds that a secondary work is merely a
satire because it does not criticize or comment on the original copyrighted
work, the secondary work may not be afforded the fair use defense.
At best, the differentiation between parodies and satires is strained.
Courts should not have the discretion to make a subjective determination
about what an original work represents or what a secondary work is
attempting to say about it. Paul Tager Lehr correctly stated, "Judges
surely are not equipped to determine what a work of art means, nor are
they equipped to distinguish a parody that comments on the original work
from a satire that uses the original work to comment on society, or on any
thing other than the original work."'
172
Additionally, why shouldn't a secondary work that used a
copyrighted work to parody society, or something other than the
copyrighted work itself, get to claim fair use? As the Court in Campbell
stated, parody has a comedic place in our society. Is a parody that
comments on society rather than another work less beneficial to society?
Arguably, it is not. To claim that only a secondary work that criticizes or
comments on the original is deserving of the fair use defense is ludicrous.
171. Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1222-24.
172. Lehr, supra note 5, at 474-75.
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If the purpose of copyright law is to encourage creativity and increase
dissemination of creative works, it is illogical to stifle one parodist while
encouraging another.
B. A Better Alternative
Instead of leaving it to the court to decide whether the secondary
work criticizes or comments on the original copyrighted work, all
parodists should be able to argue their work is a fair use of a copyrighted
work. While parodists will still have to prove the four fair use factors
weigh in their favor, the threshold question should not be whether the
secondary work is a parody or a satire. Rather, it should be presumed that
if the secondary work uses an original copyrighted work to comedically
criticize or comment on anything the author of the secondary work may
argue it falls under the protection of section 107.
The satire/parody distinction is unnecessary because the four-pronged
fair use analysis will ferret out secondary works that merely highjack a
copyrighted work for no purpose other than to avoid creativity. For
example, the first fair use prong requires a court to look at whether the
parody is transformative of the original work, which results in the creation
of a new work. Through this analysis, a court can lean toward disallowing
fair use protection for a parody that, instead of adding and building on the
original work, merely uses the copyrighted work to "avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh." 173 Section 107 requires courts to do a case-
by-case analysis of every parody claiming to be fair use of a copyrighted
work. The four-prong case-by-case analysis, alone, is enough to ensure the
exclusive rights of copyright holders are protected. The added requirement
that the parody comment on the copyrighted work itself over-protects
original works and seemingly cuts against the core purpose of copyright
law-to encourage creativity. The notion that secondary works that build
upon others' works are a vital part of furthering the dissemination of
creativity was voiced by Ninth Circuit Justice Alex Kozinski in his dissent
from that circuit's refusal to rehear White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc. 174 He stated:
Intellectual property law assures authors the rights to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely on the
ideas that underlie it. This result is neither unfair nor
unfortunate: It is the means by which intellectual property law
advances the progress of science and art. We give authors
173. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
174. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
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certain exclusive rights, but in exchange we get a richer public
domain.
175
VII. CONCLUSION
As recent district court cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court's
holding in Campbell resulted in three steps forward and two steps
backward for parodists. While Campbell helped parodists achieve fair use
protection by holding that commercial parodies were not presumptively
unfair uses, the decision made commenting on or criticizing an original
work a threshold requirement to fair use protection. In doing so, the Court
gave district courts broad discretion to determine the subject value of both
the original work and the parody. Campbell has failed to provide the
expanded protection for parody necessary to further the goals of the
Copyright Act. The Court surely erred by not taking advantage of an
opportunity to extend fair use protection and limit the discretion courts
have in deciding what should be considered fair use of a copyrighted work.
175. Id. at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
